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Abstract—By enabling wireless devices to be charged wire-
lessly and remotely, radio frequency energy harvesting (RFEH)
has become a promising technology to power the unattended
Internet of Things (IoT) low-power devices. To enable this,
in future IoT networks, besides the conventional data access
points (DAPs) responsible for collecting data from IoT devices,
energy access points (EAPs) should be deployed to transfer
radio frequency (RF) energy to IoT devices to maintain their
sustainable operations. In practice, the DAPs and EAPs may
be operated by different operators and a DAP should provide
certain incentives to motivate the surrounding EAPs to charge its
associated IoT device(s) to assist its data collection. Motivated by
this, in this paper we develop a contract theory-based incentive
mechanism for the energy trading in RFEH assisted IoT systems.
The necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of
the formulated contract is analyzed. The optimal contract is
derived to maximize the DAP’s expected utility as well as the
social welfare. Simulation results demonstrate the feasibility and
effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
By connecting objects, physical devices, vehicles, animals
and other items without human intervention, Internet of Things
(IoT) has emerged as a new paradigm to enable ubiquitous
and pervasive Internet connections [1]. Wireless sensing and
monitoring service is one of the fundamental applications of
IoT, which enables systems and users to continually monitor
ambient environment.
One of the major hurdles for implementing the wireless
sensing application is the limited lifetime of traditional battery-
powered sensors, which are costly and hard to maintain.
For example, frequent recharging or battery replacement is
inconvenient in deserts or remote areas, and is even impossible
for some scenarios, such as toxic environment or implanted
medical applications [2]. To tackle this problem, radio fre-
quency energy harvesting (RFEH) has recently been proposed
as an attractive technology to prolong the operational lifetime
of sensors, enhance the deployment flexibility, and reduce the
maintenance costs [2], [3].
In this paper, we consider a RFEH-based IoT system con-
sisting of a data access point (DAP) and several energy access
points (EAPs). The DAP is in charge of collecting information
from its associated sensors. The sensors are assumed to have
no embedded energy supply, but they can harvest energy from
radio frequency (RF) signals radiated by the surrounding EAPs
to transmit the data to the DAP. In practice, the DAP and
EAPs may be operated by different operators. To successfully
motivate these third-party and self-interested EAPs to help
charge the sensors, effective incentive mechanisms should be
designed to improve the payoff of the DAP as well as those
of EAPs.
Traditionally, the devices belonging to the same network
with extra energy were assumed to voluntarily assist other
devices, e.g., [4]. However, this becomes no longer applica-
ble for the considered system with self-interested third-party
EAPs, as these EAPs tend to maximize their own benefits. In
[5], an incentive mechanism was designed for the system with
the similar setup where monetary rewards were provided by
the DAP to motivate third-party EAPs to assist the charging
process. This process was referred to as “energy trading”.
The authors formulated the incentive problem as a Stackelberg
game, where the DAP is the buyer for the RF energy and the
EAP competes to sell energy to the DAP. Another auction-
based incentive mechanism was developed and evaluated in
[6] for an alternative energy trading scenario with multiple
DAPs and a single EAP. In these schemes, it was assumed that
the EAP(s) will truthfully report some private information to
the DAP(s), e.g., their energy costs and channel gains between
EAPs and sensors. However, this assumption is not realistic.
Since EAPs are selfish, in practice, an EAP may provide mis-
leading information maliciously and pretend to be an EAP with
better channel condition and/or higher energy cost to cheat for
more rewards. A malicious EAP can succeed in cheating to
get more benefits because of information asymmetry in the
energy trading process. Specifically, an EAP clearly knows its
private information, such as its own energy cost and channel
conditions towards sensors to be charged, which are generally
hard to be known by the DAP. To address this issue, in this
paper we will design an effective incentive mechanism to
maximize the expected utilities of the DAP and EAPs by
overcoming the information asymmetry. We are interested in
addressing following questions without knowing the private
information of EAPs: Which EAPs the DAP should hire, how
much energy should be requested from the hired EAPs, and
how many rewards should be given to the hired EAPs?
To answer the above questions, we apply the well-
established contract theory to design the incentive mechanism
of the energy trading process in the considered RFEH-based
IoT system. Contract theory is an powerful tool originated
from economics to model the incentive mechanism under
2information asymmetry in a monopoly market. This problems
is called “adverse selection” in contract theory [7]. It has been
employed to address incentive design problems in wireless
communication areas, such as device-to-device (D2D) com-
munications [8] and cooperative spectrum sharing [9]. To the
best knowledge of the authors, this is the first work that uses
contract theory to design the incentives for the energy trading
process in RFEH-based IoT systems.
In our design, the energy trading market is analogous as
a monopoly market in economics. The DAP is the employer
who offers a contract to each EAP. The contract is composed
of a serious of contract items, which are combinations of
energy-reward pairs. Each contract item is an agreement about
how many rewards an EAP will get by contributing how
much energy. Various heterogeneous EAPs are classified into
different types according to their energy costs and instanta-
neous channel conditions. The EAPs are regarded as labors in
the market, which will choose a contract item best meeting
their interests. By properly designing the contract, an EAP’s
type will be revealed by its selection. Thus the DAP can
capture each EAP’s private information to a certain extent and
thus overcome the issue of information asymmetry. During
the design of the contract, we characterize the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the contract feasibility, i.e, in-
dividual rationality (IR) conditions and incentive capability
(IC) conditions. Subject to the IR and IC constraints, the
optimal contract under information asymmetry is derived by
maximizing the DAP’s expected utility as well as the social
welfare. Simulations validate the feasibility and effectiveness
of the proposed incentive mechanism.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider one DAP and N EAPs belonging to different
operators, which are connected to constant power supplies. The
DAP is responsible for collecting various data from several
wireless-powered sensors within its serving region. Without
embedded energy supplies, the wireless-powered sensors fully
rely on the energy harvested from the RF signals emitted by
the EAPs to transmit its information to the DAP. For simplicity,
we consider that the RF energy transfer and information trans-
mission are performed over orthogonal bandwidth. Since the
EAPs are assumed to belong to different operators, they cannot
collude with each other, i.e., energy trading among EAPs is
not considered. For analytical tractability, time division-based
transmission among sensors is adopted, i.e., there is only one
active sensor during each transmission block. Hereafter, we
refer to this active sensor as the information source. Besides,
all the nodes in the system are assumed to be equipped with
single antenna and operate in the half-duplex mode.
The DAP will offer a contract to effectively motivate the
EAPs to charge its information source (i.e., the active sensor).
In practice, the EAPs can be heterogeneous with different
energy costs and instantaneous channel gains towards the in-
formation source. Obviously, there is asymmetric information
between the DAP and EAPs. To be more precise, each EAP
knows exactly its energy cost and channel status1, which is,
1Note that each EAP can estimate its channel towards the sensor via the
uplink pilots sent by the sensor.
however, unknown to the DAP. To overcome this information
asymmetry, the DAP will design a group of energy-reward
contract items. Rewards can be monetary incentive or free
offloading data between operators.
We consider that the energy-carrying signals sent by the
EAPs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ran-
dom variables with zero mean and unit variance. Note that no
coordination between the EAPs is needed since independent
signals are transmitted. All channels are assumed to experience
independent slow and flat fading, where the channel gains
remain constant during each transmission block and change
independently from one block to another. The information
source rectifies the RF signals received from the EAPs and
uses the harvested energy to transmit its information. The time
duration of every transmission block is normalized to one. So
we use “energy” and “power” interchangeably hereafter. The
amount of energy harvested by the information source during
one transmission block can be expressed as
Es = η
N∑
m=1
pmGm,s, (1)
where 0 < η < 1 is the energy harvesting efficiency, pm is
the charging power of the mth EAP, and Gm,s is the channel
power gain between the mth EAP and the information source.
Note that the noise is ignored in (1) since it is practically
negligible at the energy receiver.
The harvest-use protocol is considered in this paper [10].
More specifically, the information source will use the har-
vested energy to perform instantaneous information transmis-
sion to the DAP. We consider a battery-free design which
indicates that the sensor only has a storage device like su-
percapacitor to hold the harvested energy for a short period of
time, e.g., among its scheduled transmission block. Hence the
sensor exhausts all the harvested energy in each transmission
block, so the sensor’s energy storage device is emptied at
the beginning of the transmission block. This battery-free
design can reduce the complexity and costs of the sensors,
which is particularly suitable for the considered IoT sensing
applications and has been adopted by other applications [11],
[12]. The transmit power of the information source is
Ps = Es. (2)
Then, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the DAP is
β =
psGa,s
N0
, (3)
where N0 is the noise power at the DAP, and Ga,s is the
channel power gain from the information source to the DAP.
Hence the achievable throughput (bps) from the information
source to the DAP can be expressed by
Rsa = W log2(1 + β)
= W log2
(
1 +
ηGa,s
N0
N∑
m=1
pmGm,s
)
,
(4)
3whereW is the bandwidth. We define the received power con-
tributed by themth EAP as qm = pmGm,s and γ = ηGa,s/N0
for notation simplicity. So (4) is simplified as
Rsa = W log2
(
1 + γ
N∑
m=1
qm
)
. (5)
In the following subsections, we will define the utilities of
the DAP and EAPs as well as the social welfare.
A. DAP’s Utility
Note that the aim of the DAP is to pay less rewards to the
EAPs to achieve higher throughput. The DAP’s utility can thus
be defined as
UDAP =W log2
(
1 + γ
N∑
m=1
qm
)
− c
N∑
m=1
pim, (6)
where pim is the money (or amount of free offloading data)
paid by the DAP to the mth EAP for its corresponding
contribution qm, and c is the unit cost of the DAP, which
is normalized as c = 1 without loss of generality.
B. EAPs’ Utilities
The utility of the kth EAP is defined as
Uk = pik − Ck(pk), (7)
where pk = qk/Gk,s is the transmit power of the kth EAP,
and Ck(·) is used to model the energy cost of the kth EAP,
given by
Ck(x) = akx
2, (8)
where ak > 0. Note that the above quadratic function has
been widely adopted in the energy trading market to model
the energy cost [13]. Equivalently, (7) can be rewritten as
Uk = pik −
ak
G2k,s
q2k. (9)
We define the type of the kth EAP as
θk :=
G2k,s
ak
, (10)
which suggests that the stronger the channel quality Gk,s
between the EAP and the information source, and/or the lower
the unit power cost ak, the higher the type of the EAP. Without
loss of generality, we assume that there are totally K types of
EAPs with θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK . In this definition, the higher
type EAP has better channel quality and/or lower energy cost.
Note that since ak > 0 and Gk,s > 0, θ > 0 holds. Using
(10), the EAP’s utility can be rewritten as
Uk = pik −
q2k
θk
. (11)
Assume there are Nk EAPs belonging to the kth type, we thus
have
∑K
k=1Nk = N . We then can rewrite the DAP’s utility
according to the types of EAPs as
UDAP = W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
Nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
Nkpik. (12)
C. Social Welfare
The social welfare is defined as the summation of the
utilities of the DAP and all N EAPs, given by
Γ = UDAP +
K∑
k=1
NkUk
= W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
Nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
Nkq
2
k
θk
.
(13)
It can be seen that the internal transfers, i.e., rewards, are
cancelled in the social welfare, which is consistent with
the aim to maximize the efficiency of the whole system,
i.e., achieving more throughput at the cost of less energy
consumptions.
III. CONTRACT FORMULATION
In this section, we will formulate a contract for the energy
trading between the DAP and EAPs, characterize its feasibility
conditions, and derive the optimal contract subject to the
feasibility conditions.
To overcome the information asymmetry, a contract includ-
ing a series of energy-reward pairs (qk, pik) (i.e., contract item)
is designed to maximize the expectation of the DAP’s utility,
which is consistent with the social welfare in our model. For
the kth type EAP, qk is the received power contributed by kth
EAP2 and pik is the money paid to the kth EAP as the reward
for its contribution.
A. Optimal Contract with Asymmetric Information
Generally, the first step in a contract design is to figure
out its feasibility conditions. In our design, to encourage the
EAPs to participate in the charging process and ensure that
each EAP only chooses the contract item designed for its
type, the following individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints should be satisfied [7].
Definition 1: Individual Rationality (IR). The contract item
that an EAP chooses should ensure a nonnegative utility, i.e.,
Uk = pik −
q2k
θk
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (14)
Definition 2: Incentive Compatibility (IC). An EAP of any
type k prefers to choose the contract item (qk, pik) designed
for its type, instead of any other contract item (qj , pij), ∀j ∈
{1, . . . ,K} and j 6= k, given by
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pij −
q2j
θk
, ∀k, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (15)
The IR condition requires that the received reward of each
EAP should compensate the cost of its consumed energy when
it participates in the energy trading. If Uk ≤ 0, the EAP will
choose not to charge the information source for the DAP.
We define this case as (qk = 0, pik = 0). The IC condition
ensures that each EAP automatically selects the contract item
2Note that the received power contributed by each EAP is assumed to
be distinguishable by considering that the EAPs work in disjoint narrow
bandwidth.
4designed for its corresponding type. The type of each EAP
is thus revealed to the DAP, which is called “self-reveal”. If
a contract satisfies the IR and IC constraints, we refer to the
contract as a feasible contract.
In this paper, we consider a scenario with strong information
asymmetry. In such a scenario, the DAP is only aware of the
total number of EAPs (i.e., N ) and the distribution of each
type. But it does not know the exact number of each type k
(i.e., Nk). So the DAP needs to optimize its expected utility
over the possibilities of all possible combinations of Nk. The
expected utility of the DAP with N EAPs is given by
E{UDAP } =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑
K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0{
Φn1,...,nK
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
nkpik
]}
,
(16)
where Φn1,...,nK is the probability of a certain combination of
the number of EAPs belonging to each type (i.e., Nk, {k =
1, 2, . . . ,K}) and nK = N −
∑K−1
i=0 ni is known after giving
n1, n2, . . . , nK−1 since the DAP knows the total number N
of EAPs. We assume that all types are uniformly distributed,
so the probability of one EAP belonging to each type is the
same, which is 1/K . In this case, Φn1,...,nK can be calculated
as
Φn1,...,nK = Pr (N1 = n1, N2 = n2, . . . , Nk = nk)
=
N !
n1!n2! . . . nK !KN
(17)
Recall that the DAP aims at maximizing its expected utility
subjecting to the constraints of IR and IC given in (14) and
(15). Thus, the optimal contract becomes
max
(qk,pik)
E{UDAP }
s.t. pik −
q2k
θk
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pij −
q2j
θk
, ∀k, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
qk ≥ 0, pik ≥ 0, θk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(18)
The first two constraints correspond to IR and IC, respectively.
Note that the EAP will reveal its private type truthfully
with the IR and IC constraints. Specifically, the IR condition
ensures the EAP’s participation and the IC condition ensures
that each EAP selects the contract item designed for its
corresponding type to gain highest payoff.
B. Problem Transformation
There are K IR constraints and K(K − 1) IC constraints
in (18), which are non-convex and couple different EAPs
together. It is hard to solve (18) directly due to the complicated
constraints. Motivated by this, in the subsection we first reduce
the constraints of (18) and transform it.
We first realize that the following necessary conditions can
be derived from the IR and IC constraints.
Lemma 1: For any feasible contract, pii > pij if and only
if qi > qj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and pii = pij if and only if
θi = θj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Lemma 2: For any feasible contract, pii = pij if and only if
θi = θj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Lemma 3: For any feasible contract, if θi > θj , then pii >
pij , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Note that the proof for Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 are omitted
due to the space limitation. Lemma 1 shows that the EAP
contributing more received power at the information source
will receive more reward. Lemma 2 indicates that the EAPs
providing the same received power will get the same amount
of reward. Lemma 3 shows that a higher type EAP should be
given more reward. Together with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it
can be duduced that a higher type EAP also contributes more
energy to the information source. We define this feature as
monotonicity.
Definition 3: Monotonicity. If θi ≥ θj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
and then pii ≥ pij .
Based on the above analysis, we can now use the IC
condition to reduce the IR constraints and have the following
lemma.
Lemma 4: With the IC condition, the IR constraints can be
reduced as
pi1 −
q21
θ1
≥ 0. (19)
Proof. Due to the IC condition, we have
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pi1 −
q21
θk
. (20)
Since we have defined that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK , we have
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pi1 −
q21
θ1
≥ 0. (21)
Note that (21) shows that with the IC condition, if the IR
condition of the EAP with type θ1 holds, the IR condition of
the other K − 1 types will also hold. So the other K − 1 IR
conditions can be bind into the IR condition of the EAP with
type θ1.
We can also reduce the IC constraints and attain the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 5: With monotonicity, the IC condition can be
reduced as the local downward incentive compatibility (LDIC),
given by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, (22)
and the local upward incentive compatibility (LUIC), given by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, (23)
Proof. There are K(K − 1) IC constraints in (18), which can
be divided intoK(K−1)/2 downward incentive compatibility
(DIC), given by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, ∀i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, i > j, (24)
5and K(K−1)/2 upward incentive compatibility (UIC), given
by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, ∀i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, i < j, (25)
Let’s first prove the DIC can be reduced as the LDIC. By
using the LDIC for three continuous types, θi−1 < θi <
θi+1, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}, we have
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii −
q2i
θi+1
, (26)
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi
, ∀i. (27)
By applying the monotonicity, i.e., if θi > θj , then pii > pij ,
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we have
θi+1(pii − pii−1) ≥ θi(pii − pii−1), (28)
Combine (27) and (28), we have
pii −
q2i
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
. (29)
Combine (29) and (26), we have
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
. (30)
So far, we have proved that type θi+1 will prefer contract item
(qi+1, pii+1) rather than contract item (qi−1, pii−1). By using
(30), it can be extended downward until type θ1, and thus all
DIC holds.
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
≥ . . . ≥ pi1 −
q21
θ1
, ∀i. (31)
So we conclude that with the monotonicity and the LDIC, the
DIC holds. Similarly, we can prove that with the monotonicity
and the LUIC, the UIC holds.
The LDIC and the LUIC can be combined as shown in
Lemma 6.
Lemma 6: Since the optimization objective function is an
increasing function of qk and a decreasing function of pik, the
above optimal problem can be further simplified as
max
(qm,pim)
E{UDAP}
s.t. pi1 −
q21
θ1
= 0,
pik −
q2k
θk
= pik−1 −
q2k−1
θk
, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
piK ≥ piK−1 ≥ · · · ≥ pi1,
qk ≥ 0, pik ≥ 0, θk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(32)
The proof of Lemma 6 is omitted due to the space limitation.
We now solve the optimization problem (32) to attain the opti-
mal contract in the subsequent way: a standard method is first
applied to resolve the relaxed problem without monotonicity
and the solution is then verified to satisfy the condition of
the monotonicity. By iterating the first and second constraints
in (32) and substituting pik, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} into E{UDAP },
TABLE I: System Settings
Parameters Values
Energy harvesting efficiency η 0.5
Bandwidth W 1MHz
Energy cost coefficient am [0.1,1]
dm,s [5m,10m]
da,s [15m,25m]
Path-loss coefficient α 2
Power attenuation at reference distance of 1m 30dB
Noise power N0 10
−8mW
all pik, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are removed from the optimization
problem (32), which becomes
max
qk
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑
K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0
Φn1,...,nK
×
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K−1∑
k=1
(
1
θk−1
K∑
i=k
ni +
1
θk
K∑
i=k+1
ni
)
q2k −
nK
θK
q2K
]
,
s.t. qk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(33)
Note that (33) becomes a concave problem. So we can leverage
standard convex optimization tools in [14] to solve it to get
qk, and then pik can be calculated iteratively by the first two
constraints in (33). Moreover, monotonicity is met automati-
cally when the type is uniformly distributed [7]. So far, we
have derived the optimal contract (qk, pik), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
which can maximize the utility of the DAP and satisfy the
constraints of IR and IC.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first evaluate the feasibility of the
proposed contract, and then demonstrate the performance of
the proposed incentive mechanism. For the purpose of com-
parisons, another two incentive mechanisms are also simulated
in this section. The performance of the optimal contract with
complete information (i.e., the DAP knows exactly the types of
the EAPs) is introduced as the upper bound. The other one is a
linear incentive mechanism, in which the DAP sets a uniform
price P for unit quality of received energy that is optimized
to maximize the utility of the DAP.
The main system parameters are shown in Table I. Since θ =
G2m,s/am and γ = ηGa,s/N0, the practical ranges of θ and γ
can be determined by the parameters shown in Table I. The
DAP’s type θ is uniformly distributed. The unit of achievable
throughput is set as Mbps.
To verify the feasibility (i.e., IR and IC) of the proposed
scheme under information asymmetry, the utilities of EAPs
with type 3, type 6 and type 9 are plotted in Fig. 2 as functions
of all contract items (qk, pik), k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K. It can be seen
that each of the utility achieves its peak value only when it
chooses the contract item designed for its corresponding type,
which suggests the IC constraint is satisfied. For example,
for the type 6 EAP, it achieves the peak value only when
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Fig. 1: Utilities of EAPs with type 3, type 6 and type 9 as
functions of contract items designed for all kinds of EAPs
from type 1 to type 10. We set N = 5 and K = 10.
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Fig. 2: Social welfare as a function of γ. We set N = 2 and
K = 5.
it selects the contract item (q6, pi6), which is designed for
its type. If the type 6 EAP selects any other contract item
(qk, pik), k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K and k 6= 6, its utility will be less
than that when it selects the contract item (q6, pi6). Moreover,
when each of above type EAPs (i.e., type 3, type 6 and type 9)
chooses the contract item designed for its corresponding type,
the utilities are nonnegative. Note that similar phenomenon can
be observed for all other types of EAPs when they select the
contract item designed for their corresponding types, which are
not shown in Fig. 1 for brevity. So the IR condition is satisfied.
It can be concluded that utilizing the proposed scheme, EAPs
will automatically reveal its type to the DAP after its selection.
This means that using the proposed scheme, the DAP can
capture the EAPs’ private information (i.e., its type), and thus
overcome the problem of information asymmetry.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme with
asymmetric information, we compare its corresponding social
welfare with those of the optimal scheme with complete
information and another linear scheme with asymmetric in-
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Fig. 3: Normalized social welfare as a function of γ. We set
N = 2 and K = 5.
formation. Fig. 2 plots the curves of the social welfare as a
function of γ. Fig. 3 shows the normalized social welfare as
a function of γ, where social welfare of the proposed scheme
and linear scheme are normalized by the social welfare of the
optimal scheme with complete information. It can be observed
from Fig. 2 that the utilities achieved by three of schemes all
increase with γ. This is because with the same
∑N
m=1 qm, the
larger the value of γ, the larger the achievable throughput Rsa
(refer to (5)), and thus larger social welfare (refer to (13)).
Moreover, it is also shown in Fig. 2 that the performance
of the optimal scheme with complete information providing
the best performance serving as the upper bound, and the
the performance of the linear scheme is the worst. It can be
seen in Fig. 3 that the performance of the proposed scheme is
generally larger that 85% of that of the optimal scheme with
complete information, and gradually approach to it with the
increasing of γ. This demonstrates that the proposed incentive
mechanism can effectively overcome information asymmetry
by leveraging contract theory. While the performance of the
linear scheme is generally less than 50% of that of the optimal
scheme with complete information. This is because the linear
scheme does not utilize the private information (i.e., type) of
the EAPs, and thus achieves a much lower social welfare.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We developed a contract theory based incentive mechanism
for the energy trading in radio frequency energy harvesting
(RFEH) based Internet of Things (IoT) systems. By providing
compatible incentive to the energy access points (EAPs)
under information asymmetry, the expected utility of the data
access points (DAP) as well as social welfare is maximized.
Moreover, the proposed mechanism can approach the perfor-
mance of the optimal contract with complete information and
significantly outperform the linear pricing-based approach.
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